Commentary / Mani Shankar Aiyar
Karunanidhi signaled his disapproval of the IPKF by refusing to
greet the jawans when they disembarked at Madras
In July 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi journeyed to Colombo to conclude the India-Sri Lanka accord which put the seal on India's
reaffirmation of its commitment to the unity and integrity of
Sri Lanka but set in motion a constitutional process designed
to devolve autonomy to the regions of Sri Lanka, notably the north
and east region where the Sri Lankan Tamils were concentrated.
The nexus between India and the Sri Lankan Tamil organisations
dates back to this 1983-87 period. The DMK quite correctly points
to the many and varied links between Prime Ministers Indira and
Rajiv Gandhi, on the one hand, and the Sri Lankan Tamil freedom
fighters, including the LTTE, on the other; as also the many and
varied links between AIADMK chief minister M G Ramachandran
and the Sri Lankan Tamil freedom fighters, including the LTTE.
Highlighting these links is integral to the DMK's argument that
its relationship with the LTTE in 1990-91 is to be seen as no
more than a continuation of the kind of links which had been forged
with the Sri Lankan Tamil organisations, including the LTTE, by
the Congress and the AIADMK, the ruling parties respectively at
the Centre and is the state capital, prior to the DMK winning
the state assembly elections of January 1989.
Between July 1987 and January 1991, however, there had been a
material change in the situation in many crucial respects. the
July 1987 accord had bound down all the parties concerned-- Sri
Lanka, the Sri Lanka Tamil organisations and India --to the non-violent
political process of constitutional devolution heralded by the
Rajiv-Jayawardene agreement.
The induction of the Indian Peace-Keeping
Force -- which, it must be emphasised, was not part of the
India-Sri Lanka accord but a separate arrangement-- was designed
to keep the peace in Sri Lanka between the Sri Lankan army andthe militant Tamil guerrillas and protect the civilian population,
while the peaceful constitutional process of devolution got underway.
The IPKF did, indeed, succeed in large measure in insulating the
Tamils from the Sri Lankan army -- but, within a few months of
its deployment, found itself at war with one of the Tamil militant
groups, the LTTE, which repudiated the accord and set up on establishing
its total dominance over the movement by the ruthless elimination
of all other Sri Lankan Tamil organisations.
Its particular target
of attack was the EPRLF which had whole-heartedly co-operated with
all concerned in implementing the accord and had won the elections
(boycotted by the LTTE) to the North and East Provincial Council.
Its leader, Varadharaja Perumal, was the elected chief minister
of the North and East Province.
After Jayaa`wardene was replaced as president of Sri Lanka by R Premadasa
and Rajiv Gandhi by V P Singh as prime minister of India, India
acceded to the Sri Lankan demand for the withdrawal of the IPKF
even though this meant the dissolution of the elected autonomous
council and a freezing of the constitutional process of devolution.
Karunanidhi signaled his disapproval of the IPKF by refusing to
greet the Indian jawans when they disembarked at Madras.
The return of the IPKF also signalled the intensification on Indian
soil of the rivalry between the different Sri Lankan Tamil organisations
and the struggle for the confirmation of the overlordship of the
movement by the LTTE through the elimination by violence of all
other Sri Lankan Tamil freedom fighting groups.
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